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Abstract. The mathematical nature of modern physics suggests that mathematics is bound to 
play some role in explaining physical reality. Yet, there is an ongoing controversy about the 
prospects of mathematical explanations of physical facts and their nature. A common view has 
it that mathematics provides a rich and indispensable language for representing physical reality 
but that, ontologically, physical facts are not mathematical and, accordingly, mathematical facts 
cannot really explain physical facts. In what follows, I challenge this common view. I argue 
that, in addition to its representational role, in modern physics mathematics is constitutive of the 
physical. Granted the mathematical constitution of the physical, I propose an account of 
explanation in which mathematical frameworks, structures, and facts explain physical facts. In 
this account, mathematical explanations of physical facts are either species of physical 
explanations of physical facts in which the mathematical constitution of some physical facts in 
the explanans are highlighted, or simply explanations in which the mathematical constitution of 
physical facts are highlighted. In highlighting the mathematical constitution of physical facts, 
mathematical explanations of physical facts deepen and increase the scope of the understanding 
of the explained physical facts. I argue that, unlike other accounts of mathematical explanations 
of physical facts, the proposed account is not subject to the objection that mathematics only 
represents the physical facts that actually do the explanation. I conclude by briefly considering 
the implications that the mathematical constitution of the physical has for the question of the 
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1 The orthodoxy 
 
Modern physics is highly mathematical, and its enormous success seems to suggest that 
mathematics is very effective as a tool for representing the physical realm. Nobel 
Laureate Eugene Wigner famously expressed this view in “The unreasonable 
effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences”: 
 
the mathematical formulation of the physicist’s often crude experience leads in an 
uncanny number of cases to an amazingly accurate description of a large class of 
phenomena (Wigner 1960, p. 8).  
 
The great success of mathematical physics has led many to wonder about the causes of 
and reasons for the effectiveness of mathematics in representing the physical realm. 
Wigner thought that this success is unreasonable and even miraculous.   
 
The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the 
formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand 
nor deserve. (Ibid., 1960, p. 11) 
 
Mathematics is commonly conceived as the study of purely abstract concepts and 
structures and the question is how such concepts and structures could be so successful in 
representing the physical realm.2   
 
The ubiquity and great success of mathematics in physics does not only raise the puzzle 
of the “unreasonable” effectiveness of mathematics in physics. It also suggests that 
mathematics is bound to play a role in explaining physical reality. Yet, there is an 
ongoing controversy about the prospects and nature of mathematical explanations of 
physical facts. (Henceforth, the term ‘physical fact’ is meant to subsume all aspects of the 
physical, such as laws, principles, properties, relations, etc. Further, for the sake of 
                                               
2 Steiner (1998, p. 9) argues that there are two problems with Wigner’s formulation of question of 
the “unreasonable” success of mathematics in the natural sciences. First, Wigner ignores the cases 
in which “scientists fail to find appropriate mathematical descriptions of natural phenomena” and 
the “mathematical concepts that never have found an application.” Second, Wigner focuses on 
individual cases of successful applications of mathematical concepts, and these successes might 
have nothing to do with the fact that a mathematical concept was applied. Steiner seeks to 
formulate the question of the astonishing success of the applicability of mathematics in the 
natural sciences in a way that escapes these objections. He argues that in their discoveries of new 
theories, scientists relied on mathematical analogies. Often these analogies were ‘Pythagorean’, 
meaning that they were inexpressible in any other language but that of pure mathematics. That is, 
often the strategy that physicists pursued to guess the laws of nature was Pythagorean: “they used the 
relations between the structures and even the notations of mathematics to frame analogies and guess 
according to those analogies” (ibid., p. 4). Steiner argues that although not every guess, or even a large 
percentage of the guesses, was correct, this global strategy was astonishingly successful.  
        Steiner’s reasoning and examples are intriguing and deserve an in-depth study, which, for want of 
space, I need to postpone for another opportunity. I believe, though, that such a study will not change 
the main thrust of my analysis of the question of the mathematical constitution of the physical and its 
implication for the questions of mathematical explanations of physical facts and the “unreasonable 
effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences”.    
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simplicity and continuity with the literature, I will use the term ‘physical facts’ to be 
more general so as to include natural facts.) A common view has it that mathematics 
provides a rich and indispensable language for representing physical reality but could not 
play a role in explaining physical facts. Another related prevalent view is that, 
ontologically, the physical is to be sharply distinguished from the mathematical. Thus, it 
is common to think that sharing mathematical properties does not entail sharing physical 
properties. The idea is that, fundamentally, physical facts are not mathematical, and that 
mathematics only provides a language for representing the physical realm, even if this 
language is indispensable in the sense of being by far the most effective. These common 
views about the nature of physical facts and the role that mathematics plays in physics 
seem to be dogmas of contemporary mainstream schools of philosophy of science. 
Accordingly, the idea that mathematical facts could explain physical facts seems 
puzzling: How could facts about abstract, non-physical entities, which obtain in all 
‘possible worlds’ (including ‘non-physical’ ones) and are ontologically separated from 
the physical, explain physical facts?  
 
It should not be surprising then that until recently the subject of mathematical 
explanations of physical facts drew little attention in the philosophical literature. Yet, a 
recent interest in philosophical questions concerning the application of mathematics in 
the natural sciences has led philosophers to study the prospects and nature of 
mathematical explanations of physical facts, and various accounts of such explanations 
have been proposed (see, for example, Steiner 1978, Clifton 1998, Colyvan 2001, 2002, 
Batterman 2002, 2010, 2018, Pincock 2004, 2011a,b, 2012, 2015, Baker 2005, 2009, 
2017, Bokulich 2008a,b, 2011, Dorato and Felline 2011, Lyon 2012, Batterman and Rice 
2014, Lange 2016, 2018, Baron, Colyvan and Ripley 2017, Bueno and French 2018, 
Felline 2018, Mancosu 2018). These accounts are clearly intended to offer non-causal 
explanations of physical facts. Yet, the exact nature of the explanations on offer is 
unclear. For example, some of these accounts attempt to show that mathematical facts or 
mathematical structures ‘could make a difference’ to physical facts (Bokulich 2008a,b, 
2011, Pincock 2011b, 2015, Baron, Colyvan and Ripley 2017). But granted the common 
view that, ontologically, there is a sharp distinction between the physical and the 
mathematical, it is not clear how mathematical structures or mathematical facts could 
make such a difference and what the nature of the difference making is. (Hereafter, by 
‘mathematical facts’ I will mean mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4.)  
 
Further, the term ‘mathematical explanation of physical facts’ is ambiguous. In what 
follows, by this term I shall mean explanations in which mathematical frameworks, 
structures, or facts explain physical facts. This kind of explanation is to be distinguished 
from explanations of physical facts that merely appeal to mathematical frameworks, 
structures, or facts in order to represent physical facts. In the literature, there are various 
putative examples of mathematical explanations of physical facts and attempts to 
subsume them under a general account. In Section 9, I will consider four such accounts. I 
will argue that the nature of explanation in these accounts is unclear and that they are 
subject to the objection that the mathematical frameworks, structures, or facts they appeal 




2 An alternative perspective  
 
Although those who advocate the existence of mathematical explanations of physical 
facts endorse the idea of the indispensability of mathematics in physics, they seem to 
presuppose that mathematics does not play a constitutive role in defining what the 
physical is. I shall propose below that a way to circumvent the conundrum that current 
accounts of mathematical explanations of physical facts encounter is to acknowledge that, 
in modern natural sciences, the mathematical is constitutive of the physical. I believe that 
there are good reasons to think that contemporary natural science is in effect committed 
to such constitution. In particular, I will argue that if physical facts are fundamentally 
non-mathematical, the common wisdom about how mathematical models represent 
physical systems – which is based on the so-called ‘mapping account’ – becomes a 
mystery. Accordingly, the idea that there is a mathematical constitution of the physical 
should appeal to anybody who accepts the mapping account as a necessary part of 
mathematical representation of physical facts, independently of their view about whether 
mathematical explanations of physical facts exist. In fact, reflecting on the nature of the 
physical in contemporary physics, I will argue that this idea should also be compelling to 
those who reject the mapping account as a necessary part of mathematical 
representations.  
 
Granted the mathematical constitution of the physical, I shall propose a new account of 
mathematical explanation of physical facts. The main idea of this account is that a 
mathematical explanation of physical facts highlights the mathematical constitution of 
some physical facts, thus deepening and increasing the scope of the understanding of 
these and other related physical facts. While this account could be applied to many of the 
putative examples of mathematical explanations of physical facts in the literature, the 
question whether it could account for all kinds of putative mathematical explanations of 
physical facts is beyond the scope of this paper for various reasons. First, as mentioned 
above, the term ‘mathematical explanation of physical facts’ is ambiguous and my 
understanding of it need not agree with all of its applications in the literature. Second, for 
lack of space and to keep things as simple as possible, I will only sketch the proposed 
account and consider it mainly in the context of simple examples of mathematical 
explanations of physical facts. Third, the range of putative examples I have encountered 
is not sufficiently broad to support such a grand claim. Yet, I think that there are good 
reasons to believe that the proposed account could be applied to all the examples of 
mathematical explanations of physical facts in which mathematical frameworks, 
structures, or facts are supposed to explain physical facts. 
 
The current study was inspired by an exchange that I had with participants of a workshop 
on the role of mathematics in science at the Institute for the History and Philosophy of 
Science and Technology at the University of Toronto in October 2010. To my surprise, 
the common view was that while mathematics is very important for representing physical 
systems/states/properties/laws, it does not play any constitutive role in physics. Even 
more surprising, this view was also shared by supporters of ontic structural realism, for 
whom such a constitution seems to be a natural premise. The workshop on Mathematical 
and Geometrical Explanations at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona in March 2012 
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and subsequent conferences and colloquia provided me with the opportunity to present 
the proposed account of mathematical explanation of physical facts, and the invitation to 
contribute to the second volume in honor of Itamar Pitowsky prompted me to write up 
this paper.  
 
Pitowsky had a strong interest in mathematics and its use in physics. His research covers 
various topics in these fields: the philosophical foundations of probability; the nature of 
quantum probability and its relation to classical probability and quantum logic; the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, in general, and as a theory of probability, in 
particular; quantum non-locality; computation complexity and quantum computation; and 
probability in statistical mechanics. This research has inspired a new perspective on the 
non-classical nature of quantum probability, quantum logic, and quantum non-locality, 
and influenced our understanding of these issues.3 Pitowsky’s view of the relationship 
between mathematics and physics is less known, however. Based on his commentary on 
Lévy-Leblond’s reflections on the use and effectiveness of mathematics in physics in the 
Bar-Hillel colloquium in the mid 1980s, in the next section I present his  thoughts on 
these topics. Lévy-Leblond’s and Pitowsky’s reflections on the subject will provide a 
background for the main focus of the paper: the mathematical constitution and 
mathematical explanations of physical facts. Both Lévy-Leblond and Pitowsky embrace 
the idea of the mathematical constitution of the physical. Yet, it is not clear from their 
discussion what the exact nature of this constitution is. In Section 4, I review two 
traditional conceptions of mathematical constitution of physical facts – the Pythagorean 
and the neo-Kantian – and briefly give an example of mathematical constitution of 
physical facts. In Section 5, I review the common view of how mathematical 
models/theories represent physical facts. The main idea of this view is that a 
mathematical model/theory represents the properties of its target physical entities on the 
basis of a similarity between the relevant mathematical structure in the model/theory and 
the structure of the properties of these entities. More precisely, the idea is that there is an 
appropriate structure-preserving mapping between the mathematical system in the 
model/theory and the properties and relations of the represented physical entities. I will 
argue that the mapping account undermines the idea that physical facts are non-
mathematical. Further, in Section 6, I will argue that a reflection on the concept of the 
physical in modern physics supports the idea that the physical is constituted by the 
mathematical. In Section 7, I will suggest that the philosophical interpretative 
frameworks of scientific theories/models in natural science determine the scope rather 
than the existence of the mathematical constitution of the physical. In Section 8, I will 
present the main ideas of the proposed account of mathematical explanation of physical 
facts. This account is sufficiently general so as to be integrated into the frameworks of 
various existing accounts of explanation. Accordingly, existing accounts of mathematical 
explanation of physical facts can be revised along the lines of the new account to yield 
accounts of explanations which embody the idea that mathematical explanations of 
physical facts highlight the mathematical constitution of physical facts and accordingly 
deepen and increase the scope of understanding of the explained physical facts. In 
Section 9, I will consider four existing accounts of mathematical explanation of physical 
                                               3	For a list of Pitowsky’s publications, see  https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-
contributions/72394418_Itamar_Pitowsky .	
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facts. I will argue that the exact nature of explanation in these accounts is unclear and, 
moreover, that they are subject to the objection that mathematics only plays a 
representational role, representing the physical facts that actually have the explanatory 
power. In Section 10, I will conclude by briefly commenting on the implications of the 
mathematical constitution of the physical for the question of the unreasonable 
effectiveness of mathematics in physics.       
 
 
3 On the relationship between mathematics and physics  
 
There is a broad consensus among physicists and philosophers that mathematics 
constitutes the language of modern physics. Poincaré expressed this view succinctly.  
 
[O]rdinary language is too poor, it is also too vague, to express relationships so 
delicate, so rich, and so precise. This, then, is a primary reason why the physicist 
cannot do without mathematics; it furnishes him with the only language he can 
speak (Poincaré 1913, p. 141).    
 
Lévy-Leblond (1992, p. 147) notes that the picture of mathematics as the language of 
physics is ambiguous and admits two different interpretations: mathematics as the 
intrinsic language of Nature, which has to be mastered in order to understand her 
workings; and mathematics as a special language into which facts of Nature need to be 
translated in order to be comprehended. He refers to Galileo and Einstein as advocates of 
the first view, and Heisenberg as an exponent of the second view. He does not think of 
these views as contradictory but rather as extreme positions on a continuous spectrum of 
opinions. Lévy-Leblond explores the question of the peculiar relation between 
mathematics and physics, and he contends that the view of mathematics as a special 
language of nature does not provide an answer to this question. Instead of explaining why 
mathematics applies so well to physics, this view is concerned with the supposed 
adequacy of mathematics as a language for acquiring knowledge of nature in general. In 
his view, in other natural sciences, such as chemistry, biology, and the earth sciences, we 
could talk about the relation between mathematics and the particular science as one of 
application, with the implication that “we are concerned with an instrumental relation, in 
which mathematics appears as a purely technical tool, external to its domain of 
implementation and independent of the concepts proper to that domain.” By contrast, he 
argues that mathematics plays a much deeper role in physics and that the relation between 
mathematics and physics is not instrumental (ibid., p. 148). He maintains that 
mathematics is internalized by physics and, like Bachelard (1965), he characterizes the 
relation of mathematics to physics as that of “constitutivity” (ibid., p. 149).   
 
Lévy-Leblond does not specify what he means by this relation. He notes, though, that by 
mathematics being constitutive of physics, he does not mean that a physical concept is to 
be identified with or reduced to its underlying mathematical concept(s). He also does not 
think of this relation as implying that a physical concept is a mathematical concept plus a 
physical interpretation: “the mathematical concept is not a skeleton fleshed out by 
physics, or an empty abstract form to be filled with concrete content by physics.” And, 
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again, following Bachelard, he does not conceive of the “distinction between a physical 
concept and its mathematical characterization” as static:  
 
mathematics is a dynamical ‘way of thinking’, leading from experimental facts to 
the constitution of the physical concept (ibid., p. 149).  
 
Further, Lévy-Leblond rejects the Platonic interpretation of the connection between 
mathematics and physics, according to which “the role of the physicist is to decipher 
Nature so as to reveal ‘the hidden harmony of things’ (Poincaré), as expressed by 
mathematical formulas, underlying the untidy complexity of physical facts.” For him, the 
mathematical constitution of the physical does not imply “that every physical concept is 
the contingent materialization of an absolute mathematical being which is supposed to 
express its deepest truth, its ultimate essence” (ibid., p. 150). He takes the “mathematical 
polymorphism” of physics – namely, the possibility that physical laws and concepts may 
be endowed with several mathematizations – as evidence against the Platonic viewpoint 
and for the dynamical nature of the constitutive relation between mathematics and 
physics (ibid., pp. 150-152).  
 
Lévy-Leblond also rejects the view that there is a preestablished harmony between 
physical and mathematical concepts. First, he draws attention to “the physical 
multivalence of mathematical structures (which is the converse of the mathematical 
polymorphism of physical laws), i.e., the possibility that the same mathematical theory 
may be adequate to several completely different physical domains” (ibid., p. 152). And, 
following Feynman et al. (1963, 2:12f), he maintains that “equations from different 
phenomena are so similar” not because of the physical identity of the represented 
systems, properties, or laws. Rather, it is due to “a common process of 
approximation/abstraction” that these phenomena are “encompassed by analogous 
mathematizations” (ibid., pp. 152-153). Second, he argues that, “contrary to some rash 
assertions”, it is not true that the abstract constructions elaborated by mathematics are all 
useful for the physicist. He contends that, as mathematics develops on its own, the 
fraction of mathematical theories and ideas that are utilized by physics is decreasing 
rather rapidly: while the use of mathematics in physics keeps on growing, it does so much 
less rapidly than the development of mathematics that is independent of physics (ibid., p. 
154). 
 
Lévy-Leblond’s reflections above are intended to probe the nature of the mathematical 
constitution of the physical and the special relationship between physics and 
mathematics. His main conclusions are that there is no pre-established harmony between 
physics and mathematics and that the singularity of physics in its relationship to 
mathematics is very difficult to account for on the view that mathematics is merely a 
language for representing the physical reality. Lévy-Leblond holds that if mathematics is 
conceived as merely a language, it “would necessarily have to be a universal one, 
applicable in principle to each and every natural science”, and the specificity of physics 
“must then be treated as only a matter of degree, and criteria must be found to distinguish 
it from other sciences” (ibid., p. 156). He considers two possible ways to try to explain 
the specificity of physics as a matter of degree. One is the common view that physics is 
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more advanced. The idea here is that “more precise experimental methods, a firmer 
control of experimental conditions, permit the quantitative measurement of physical 
notions, which are thus transformed into numerical magnitudes” (ibid., p. 157). The other 
explanation localizes  
 
the specificity of physics in its objects of inquiry … It is commonly stated that 
physics is “more fundamental” than the other natural sciences. Dealing with the 
deepest structures of the world, it aims to bring to light the most general laws of 
Nature, which are implicitly considered as the “simplest” and thus, in an 
Aristotelian way, as the “most mathematical” (ibid., p. 158).  
 
Lévy-Leblond rejects both explanations. He contends that the first explanation per se fails 
to explain the privileged status of physics, and, moreover, it relies on a very naive view of 
mathematics. And he claims that the second explanation implies that “mathematicity 
assumes a normative character and becomes a criterion of scientificity”, but the 
development of other sciences, such as chemistry, geology, and molecular biology seems 
to contradict this norm. He argues that these sciences are characterized by a clear-cut 
separation between their conceptual equipment and the mathematical techniques used – a 
separation that allows them to maintain a degree of autonomy even in the face of new 
developments in relevant branches of physics (ibid., pp. 148, 157-158).  
 
In the end, Lévy-Leblond fails to find an explanation for the singular relationship 
between mathematics and physics. He thus opts for a radical solution according to which 
physics is defined as any area of the natural sciences where mathematics is constitutive 
(ibid., p. 158).    
 
In his commentary on Lévy-Leblond’s reflections, Pitowsky (1992, p. 166) finds Lévy-
Leblond’s characterization of physics very attractive. He points out, though, that it is 
incomplete, as the question arises as to what makes a given use of mathematics 
constitutive rather than a mere (non-constitutive) application. Indeed, as one could see 
from the above review, the questions of the nature of the mathematical constitution of the 
physical and the distinction between constitutive and non-constitutive uses of 
mathematics remain open. While Pitowsky shares Lévy-Leblond’s intuition that the use 
of mathematics in physics is different and deeper, he finds it difficult to provide an 
analytical frame for this observation.  
 
Pitowsky also addresses the question whether Lévy-Leblond’s view of the relationship 
between mathematics and physics fits in with the reductionist ethos of science. He 
remarks that while “[o]ne of the central ideals in the scientific enterprise is to try and 
provide a unified explanation of all natural phenomena”, the sharp lines of demarcation 
that Lévy-Leblond draws “between the sciences appears to obstruct this idea, which has 
had some remarkable manifestations” (ibid., pp. 166-167).  
 
Further, Pitowsky considers Lévy-Leblond’s observation that the ratio of mathematics to 
mathematical physics increases with time. While he finds this observation correct, he 
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does not think that it settles the question of whether there is a harmony between 
mathematical structures and physical phenomena for two reasons (ibid., p. 163): 
 
(a) It is impossible to foretell which portion of mathematics is relevant to 
physics and which is not. There is no clear a priori distinction between 
pure mathematics and mathematical physics. 
 
(b) There is far more abstract mathematics involved in physics than one 
usually assumes. 
 
To motivate these claims, Pitowsky discusses Bolzano’s unintuitive example of a 
continuous function which is nowhere differentiable (ibid., pp. 163-165). The example 
was introduced at the beginning of the 19th C, but was ignored for a few decades only to 
be resurrected and expanded by Weierstrass around the middle of the 19th C.4 About 50 
years later, Wiener (1923) showed, for the probability space of the set of all possible 
continuous trajectories of Brownian particles, that (with probability one) the path taken 
by a Brownian particle is nowhere differentiable. As Pitowsky notes, continuous nowhere 
differentiable functions and similar creatures also play a role in more recent theories as 
well, such as the theory of fractals (Mandelbrot 1977). This and other examples suggest 
that abstruse mathematics plays a subtle role in physical theories, which is not 
sufficiently appreciated, and that it is impossible to tell a priori whether any such piece of 
mathematics will figure in future theories of physics.    
 
Pitowsky believes that such examples and the “entanglement of mathematical structure 
with physical fact” suggest that “there exists no a priori principle which distinguishes 
pure mathematics from applied mathematics, mathematical physics in particular”, and 
that mathematical physics is much broader than it is commonly conceived. Thus, the 
question of the “correspondence” between mathematics and physics is unavoidable, and 
“one can understand it in a naive, realistic sense, or defend a thesis with a Kantian flavor” 
(ibid., pp. 165-166).  
 
I find Lévy-Leblond’s and Pitowsky’s reflections on the relationship between 
mathematics and physics and the effectiveness of the use of mathematics in physics 
intriguing. I share with them the view that, in modern physics, mathematics is 
constitutive of the physical and that the use of mathematics in physics is more successful 
than in other natural sciences. I disagree, though, with Lévy-Leblond’s opinion that 
mathematics is only constitutive in physics. I believe that mathematics is also constitutive 
in other natural sciences. Indeed, in both of the traditional frameworks of portraying the 
physical as constituted by the mathematical – the Pythagorean and the neo-Kantian – the 
constitution pertains to the physical broadly conceived across the natural sciences. Yet, 
                                               
4 Bolzano’s example is believed to have been produced in the 1830s but the manuscript was only 
discovered in 1922 (Kowalewski 1923) and published in 1930 (Bolzano 1930). Neuenschwander 
(1978) notes that Weierstrass presented a continuous nowhere function before the Royal 
Academy of Sciences in Berlin on 18 July 1872 and that it was published first, with his assent, by 
du Bois-Reymond in 1875 (du Bois-Reymond 1875) and later in Weierstrass (1895). 
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having a unified framework does not entail that the natural sciences are reducible to 
physics.     
 
I also share with Lévy-Leblond and Pitowsky the view that the question of the particular 
success of the use of mathematics in physics is very interesting, important, and open. 
Recall that Lévy-Leblond rejects two possible explanations for the specificity of physics 
among the natural sciences: one is that physics is more advanced, and the other is that the 
objects of physics are the simplest and most fundamental. I don’t find his reasoning here 
compelling, and I believe that both of these lines of reasoning are worth pursuing. For 
example, Lévy-Leblond argues against the second explanation that it implies a false 
hierarchy of sciences where physics is the most scientific and the idea that all the natural 
sciences are reducible to physics. It is not clear to me, however, why the view that the 
objects of physics are the simplest and most fundamental has such implications. Indeed, 
one may maintain this view yet reject the suggested implications. 
 
Finally, I share with Pitowsky the view that in modern physics there is a 
“correspondence” or “harmony” between the physical and the mathematical, which could 
be understood along Pythagorean or Kantian lines. I believe that such a 
correspondence/harmony can be accounted for by the mathematical constitution of the 
physical, and in the next section I will briefly review the nature of this constitution in the 
context of Pythagorean and neo-Kantian frameworks. I also agree with Pitowsky that 
Lévy-Leblond’s observation that the ratio of mathematics to mathematical physics 
increases with time is not evidence against the correspondence/harmony between the 
physical and the mathematical, and, moreover, that there is no a priori distinction 
between pure and applied mathematics. And, similarly to him, I believe that a reflection 
on the history of science could support the absence of such a distinction. 
 
The question of the specificity of physics among the natural sciences is very interesting 
and important and deserve an in-depth consideration. Yet, for want of space, I will have 
to postpone its discussion to another opportunity and focus on the constitutive role that 
mathematics plays in physics and its implications for mathematical explanations of 
physical facts and the question of the unreasonable effectiveness of the use of 
mathematics in physics. In Sections 5 and 6, I will argue that the idea of the mathematical 
constitution of the physical can be motivated by an analysis of how mathematical systems 
represent physical phenomena and reality. In Section 7, I will consider the relevance of 
the philosophical frameworks of theories/models in natural science for the mathematical 
constitution of the physical. Granted the mathematical constitution of the physical, in 
Section 8 I propose a new account of mathematical explanation of physical facts, in 
Section 9 I compare it to exiting accounts, and in Section 10 I briefly discuss the question 
of the unreasonable effectiveness of the use of mathematics in physics. But, first, I turn to 
briefly review two ways of thinking about the mathematical constitution of physical facts.   
 
 
4 On conceptions of mathematical constitution of the physical  
 
There are two traditional ways of conceiving the mathematical constitution of the 
physical. One is along what I shall call the ‘Pythagorean picture’. There is no canonical 
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depiction of this picture. In what follows, I will consider three versions of it, due to 
Aristotle, Galileo, and Einstein.  
 
Aristotle describes the Pythagorean picture in the Metaphysics, Book 1, part 1.  
 
[T]he so-called Pythagoreans, who were the first to take up mathematics, not 
only advanced this study, but also having been brought up in it they thought 
its principles were the principles of all things. Since of these principles 
numbers are by nature the first, and in numbers they seemed to see many 
resemblances to the things that exist and come into being – more than in fire 
and earth and water (such and such a modification of numbers being justice, 
another being soul and reason, another being opportunity – and similarly 
almost all other things being numerically expressible); since, again, they saw 
that the modifications and the ratios of the musical scales were expressible in 
numbers; since, then, all other things seemed in their whole nature to be 
modelled on numbers, and numbers seemed to be the first things in the whole 
of nature, they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all 
things, and the whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number. 
 
In The Assayer Galileo endorses a different version of the Pythagorean picture. In his 
characterization, the universe is written in the language of mathematics, the characters of 
which are geometrical figures. 
 
Philosophy is written in this grand book — I mean the universe — which 
stands continually open to our gaze, but it cannot be understood unless one 
first learns to comprehend the language and interpret the characters in which 
it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics and its characters are 
triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures without which it is humanly 
impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one is wandering 
a dark labyrinth. 
 
In his lecture “On the Method of Theoretical Physics”, Einstein also seems to endorse a 
version of the Pythagorean picture. He depicts nature as the realization of mathematical 
ideas.  
 
Our experience hitherto justifies us in believing that nature is the realization of the 
simplest conceivable mathematical ideas. I am convinced that we can discover by 
means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and the laws connecting 
them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural 
phenomena. (Einstein 1933/1954) 
 
The Pythagorean picture has also been embraced by a number of other notable natural 
philosophers and physicists. While the exact nature of this picture varies from one 
version to another, all share the idea that mathematics constitutes all the elements of 
physical reality. Physical objects, properties, relations, facts, principles, and laws are 
mathematical by their very nature, so that ontologically one cannot separate the physical 
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from the mathematical. This does not mean that physical things are numbers, as it may be 
tempting to interpret Aristotle’s characterization in the Metaphysics and as it is frequently 
suggested. Rather, the idea is that mathematics defines the fundamental nature of physical 
quantities, relations, and structures. Without their mathematical properties and relations, 
physical things would have been essentially different from what they are. The 
Pythagoreans see the mathematical features of the physical as intrinsic to it, so that 
mathematics is not regarded merely as a ‘language’ or conceptual framework within 
which the physical is represented and studied.   
 
The main challenge for the Pythagoreans is to identify the mathematical frameworks that 
define the nature of the physical, especially given that both mathematics and natural 
science continue to develop. The Pythagoreans may argue, though, that it is the role of 
mathematics and natural science to discover these frameworks.    
 
The second traditional way of conceiving the mathematical constitution of the physical is 
along neo-Kantian lines, especially those of Herman Cohen and Ernest Cassirer of the 
Marburg school. Cassirer (1912/2005, p. 97) comments that Cohen held that  
 
the most general, fundamental meaning of the concept of object itself, which even 
physiology presupposes, cannot be determined rigorously and securely except in 
the language of mathematical physics. 
 
For example, in mechanics,  
 
[w]hat motion ‘‘is’’ cannot be expressed except in concepts of quantity; 
understanding these presupposes a fundamental system of a pure doctrine of 
Quantity. Consequently, the principles and axioms of mathematics become the 
specific foundation that must be taken as fixed in order to give content and sense to 
any statement of natural science about actuality. 
 
Cassirer held that mathematics is crucial for furnishing the fundamental scaffolding of 
physics, the intellectual work of understanding, and the construction of physical reality. 
 
“Pure” experience, in the sense of a mere inductive collection of isolated 
observations, can never furnish the fundamental scaffolding of physics; for it is 
denied the power of giving mathematical form. The intellectual work of 
understanding, which connects the bare fact systematically with the totality of 
phenomena, only begins when the fact is represented and replaced by a 
mathematical symbol. (Cassirer 1910/1923, p. 147) 
 
The idea is that “the chaos of impressions becomes a system of numbers” and “objective 
values” are obtained in “the transformation of impression into a mathematical ‘symbol’.”    
The physical analysis of an object “into the totality of its numerically constants” is a 
judgment in which  
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the concrete impression first changes into the physically determinate object. The 
sensuous quality of a thing becomes a physical object, when it is transformed into a 
serial determination. The “thing” now changes from a sum of properties into a 
mathematical system of values, which are established with reference to some scale 
of comparison. Each of the different physical concepts defines such a scale, and 
thereby renders possible an increasingly intimate connection and arrangement of 
the elements of the given. (Ibid., p. 149) 
 
More generally, in Cassirer’s view, the concepts of natural science are “products of 
constructive mathematical procedure.” It is only when the values of physical constants 
“are inserted in the formulae of general laws, that the manifold of experiences gains that 
fixed and definite structure, that makes ‘nature’.” The reality that natural science studies 
is a construction, and the construction is in mathematical terms.  
 
The scientific construction of reality is only completed when there are found, along 
with the general causal equations, definite, empirically established, quantitative 
values for particular groups of processes: as, for example, when the general 
principle of the conservation of energy is supplemented by giving the fixed 
equivalence-numbers, in accordance with which the exchange of energy takes place 
between two different fields. (Ibid., p. 230) 
 
In the neo-Kantian school, the mathematical constitution of natural science is the 
outcome of a historical process. The reality that mathematical natural science studies is a 
continuous serial process, and along this process the exact nature of the mathematics that 
constitutes the physical evolves.  
 
A notable example of the mathematical constitution of the physical is the role that the 
calculus plays in shaping the concepts of modern physics. For example, the concept of 
the mathematical limit constitutes the concept of instantaneous velocity and more 
generally the concept of instantaneous change. This constitution marks a very significant 
change from the concepts of instantaneous velocity and instantaneous change before the 
calculus revolution. Consider, for instance, Zeno’s arrow paradox.5 The paradox starts 
from the premise that time is composed of moments, which are indivisible, and that 
during any such moment the arrow has no time to move. Thus, since the arrow does not 
have time to move in any particular moment, it is concluded that the arrow can never be 
in motion. Zeno’s paradox suggests that in the pre-calculus era instantaneous velocity 
does not make sense. By contrast, when, based on the calculus, instantaneous velocity is 
defined as the limit of a series of average velocities as the time interval approaches zero, 
Zeno’s paradox can be circumvented.6 
                                               5	For the arrow paradox and its analysis, see for example Huggett (1999, 2019) and references 
therein.	6	Two comments: 1.	The introduction of the calculus is often presented as a solution to Zeno’s 
arrow paradox. I believe that this presentation is somewhat misleading. The calculus does not 
really solve Zeno’s paradox. It just evades it by fiat, i.e. by redefining the concept of 
instantaneous velocity. 2. For a recent example of the role that the calculus plays in constituting 
physical facts, see Stemeroff’s (2018, Chapter 3) analysis of Norton’s Dome – the thought 
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5 On the common view of how mathematical models represent physical reality  
 
In modern physics, the physical is characterized in mathematical terms. Yet, the common 
view is that, while mathematics provides a rich and indispensable language for 
representing the physical, the physical is fundamentally non-mathematical. If the physical 
is fundamentally non-mathematical, how could a mathematical model represent 
adequately physical systems?  
 
The replies to this question are often based on a widespread view that the mathematical 
structures in the model are similar or identical to the structures of the physical things that 
the model represents. More precisely, the idea is that a mathematical model represents 
physical systems in terms of an appropriate structure-preserving mapping from the 
mathematical structures that the model posits to the structures of the physical things it 
represents. Chris Pincock (2004, 2011, 2012, chap. 2) calls this conception of 
representation the ‘mapping account’.  
 
For example, a model based on Newton’s three laws of motion (together with the relevant 
‘boundary conditions’) may represent the solar system. Newton’s laws of motion are 
expressed in terms of mathematical relations.  
 
First law: The net force F on an object is zero just in case its velocity v is constant: 
 
(1)   ; 
                
where t denotes time and dv/dt denotes the derivative of velocity with respect to 
time.   
 
Second law: The net force F on an object is equal to the rate of change of its linear 
momentum p, , where m denotes the object’s mass:  
 
(2)   . 
 
Third law: For every action there is an equal and opposite re-action. That is, for 
every force exerted by object A, FA, on object B, B exerts a reaction force, FB, that 
is equal in size, but opposite in direction:  
 
(3)   .      
 
These mathematical relations are supposed to correspond to the physical relations that 
obtain between the forces acting on the planets and their masses, linear momenta, 
velocities, and accelerations, and the correspondence is achieved by a mathematical 
                                               
experiment that is purported to show that non-deterministic behaviour could exist within the 
scope of Newtonian mechanics. Stemeroff argues that: (i) this thought experiment overlooks the 
constraints that the calculus imposes on Newton’s theory; and that (ii) when these constraints are 
taken into account, Norton’s Dome is ruled out as impossible in Newtonian universes.  
 
 F = 0∑ ⇔ dv dt = 0
	p=mv







mapping from the model to the solar system.  
 
In its simplest form, the mapping account posits that a mathematical model/theory 
represents physical systems because the mathematical structures it posits are isomorphic 
to the structures of properties of, and relations between these systems. Intuitively, the 
idea is that a mathematical model and properties and relations of the physical systems it 
represents share the same structures. More precisely, there is a one-to-one mapping 
between the mathematical structures in the model and properties of, and relations 
between the represented systems. Mathematical models/theories could also represent by 
means of weaker notions of structural identity, such as partial isomorphism (French and 
Ladyman 1999), embedding (Redhead 2001), or homomorphism (Mundy 1986). Some 
other accounts of how mathematical models/theories represent take the mapping account 
to be incomplete. In particular, Bueno and Colyvan (2011, p. 347) argue that, for the 
mapping account to get started, we need something like a pre-theoretic structure of the 
world. While it is common to think of mathematical structure as a set of objects and a set 
of relations on them (Resnik 1997, Shapiro 1997), Bueno and Colyvan remarks that “the 
world does not come equipped with a set of objects ... and sets of relations on those. 
These are either constructs of our theories of the world or identified by our theories of the 
world.” Thus, the mapping account requires having what they call “an assumed structure” 
in order to get started (ibid.). Yet, Bueno and Colyvan accept the mapping account as a 
necessary part of mathematical representation of the physical world. 
 
While the mapping account is supposed to support the common view that mathematical 
models could represent physical systems even though the physical is fundamentally non-
mathematical, it actually undermines it. If the notion of representation is to be adequate, 
the notion of identity between a mathematical structure and the physical structure it 
represents has to be sufficiently precise. But it is difficult to see how the notion of 
identity between mathematical and physical structures could be sufficiently precise for 
the purposes of modern physics if physical structures did not have a mathematical 
structure. Thus, it seems that any adequate account of mathematical representation of the 
physical that is based on the mapping account (or some similar cousin of it) will have to 
presuppose that the represented physical things have mathematical structures.  
 
 
6 On the notion of the physical 
 
The above argument for the mathematical constitution of the physical is focused on 
accounts of representation which are based on the mapping account of mathematical 
representations. There have been various objections to the mapping account (see, for 
example, Frigg and Nuygen (2018) for criticism of structuralist accounts of 
representation and references therein). I believe that the main idea of the above argument 
can be extended to any account of mathematical representation of the physical, as any 
such account would have to include some aspects of the mapping account as a necessary 
component. Indeed, it is difficult to see how mathematics could have the potency it has in 
modern natural science without the mapping account. In any case, there is another 
weighty reason for rejecting the idea that the physical is non-mathematical. It is related to 
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the question of the nature of the physical, and it is applicable to all accounts of scientific 
representation, independently of whether they embody the mapping account.  
 
A key motivation for thinking about the physical as non-mathematical is an equivocation 
between two notions of the physical: 
 
(i) the physical as determined by the theoretical and experimental frameworks of 
modern physics and, more generally, modern natural science; and  
 
(ii) the physical as some kind of stuff out there, the nature of which is not defined 
by these frameworks. 
 
The second notion of the physical is too vague and rudimentary to play any significant 
role in most contemporary scientific applications. In particular, theories and models in 
physics actually refer to the first notion of the physical, where the physical is constituted 
by the mathematical in the sense that fundamental features of the physical are in effect 
mathematical. Indeed, physical objects, properties, relations and laws in modern physics 
are by their very essence characterized in mathematical terms. Yet, although the gap 
between the above notions of the physical seems unbridgeable, it is common to assume 
without a justification that our theories and models, which embody the first notion of the 
physical, are about the second notion of the physical.   
 
The considerations above suggest that in modern natural science:  
 
(a) The common view – that the physical is ontologically separated from the 
mathematical – fails to explain how mathematical models/theories could 
represent the physical. 
 
(b) The mapping account is an essential component of mathematical representations 
of the physical. 
 
(c) The mapping account requires that physical facts have mathematical structure. 
 
(d) The notion of the physical as fundamentally non-mathematical is too vague and 
rudimentary to play a significant role in modern natural science. 
 
(e) The mathematical constitution of the physical implies that the physical has a 
a mathematical structure. Accordingly, granting this constitution, it is possible 
to make sense of the idea that the mapping account is an essential component of 
mathematical representations of physical facts. 
 
 
7 On the scope of the mathematical constitution of the physical 
 
So far, I have not considered whether the interpretation of scientific theories/models 
along realist or instrumentalist lines has relevance for the question of mathematical 
constitution of the physical. The reason for overlooking this issue earlier on is that the 
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philosophical interpretative framework of theories/models in current natural science 
pertains to the scope rather than the existence of mathematical constitution of the 
physical. Under both realist and instrumentalist interpretations, the physical phenomena 
that current theories/models account for are mathematically constituted. The raw data that 
scientists collect often lack the systematicity, stability, and unity required for constructing 
these phenomena. The phenomena that our theories/models have to answer for are 
constructed from raw data in terms of various postulates and statistical inferences which 
are mathematically constituted. The scope of the mathematical constitution of physical 
facts beyond the phenomena depends on the interpretative framework. If all the current 
theories/models in natural science were interpreted as purely instrumental, so that they 
are not supposed to represent anything beyond the phenomena, the mathematical 
constitution of the physical would only concern the phenomena; for under such 
interpretative framework, natural science is not supposed to represent anything beyond 
physical phenomena. While there are reasons to consider parts of modern natural science 
as purely instrumental, it is doubtful that there is any adequate understanding of all of it 
as purely instrumental. Accordingly, it is plausible to conceive the mathematical 
constitution of the physical in modern natural science as pertaining also to various aspects 
of the physical reality beyond the phenomena. In any case, in the account of 
mathematical explanation of physical facts that I now turn to propose the extent of the 
mathematical constitution of the physical has implications for the scope rather than nature 
of mathematical explanations of physical facts.  
 
 
8 A sketch of a new account of mathematical explanation of physical facts 
 
In thinking about mathematical explanations of physical facts, it is important to 
distinguish between:  
 
(I) explanations in which mathematical frameworks, structures, or facts explain 
physical facts; and 
 
(II) explanations of physical facts that merely appeal to mathematical frameworks, 
structures, or facts in order to represent physical facts.  
 
The account suggested here aims at the first type of explanations. In these explanations, 
mathematics plays an essential role, which surpasses its representational role. While this 
requirement may seem trivial, as we shall see in the next section current accounts of 
mathematical explanation of physical facts struggle to meet it.  
 
In the proposed account, mathematical explanations of physical facts are of two related 
kinds. One kind of explanation is a subspecies of physical explanations of physical facts. 
In physical explanations of physical facts, physical facts are explained by physical facts. 
In the proposed account, mathematical explanation of physical facts are physical 
explanations of physical facts that focus on the mathematical constitution of some of the 
physical facts in the explanans. That is, it is a physical explanation of physical facts that 
highlights the mathematical constitution of some of the physical facts in the explanans, 
and by highlighting this constitution it deepens and increases the scope of the 
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understanding of the explanandum. The second kind of mathematical explanation of 
physical facts simply highlights the mathematical constitution of physical facts and, 
similarly to the first kind of explanation, by highlighting this constitution it deepens and 
increases the scope of the understanding of these facts.   
 
By physical explanation of physical facts, I shall mean explanations of: how physical 
facts (could) come about; how physical facts (could) influence or make a difference to 
other physical facts; how physical patterns or regularities (could) come about; how 
physical facts, patterns or regularities follow from, or are related to other physical facts, 
patterns, or regularities; how physical principles/laws and physical facts entail other 
physical facts; how physical principles/laws entail or are related to other physical 
principles/laws; etc. 
 
The proposed account is sufficiently open-ended to be based on existing accounts of 
explanation, such as the D-N, causal, and unification accounts of explanation. However, 
it cannot be identified with any of these accounts since it requires that the mathematical 
constitution of some physical facts in the explanans be highlighted. Given the account’s 
openness, it will be easier to demonstrate how it works by analyzing the way it 
circumvents the difficulties that current accounts of mathematical explanations of 
physical facts encounter. In the next section, I will consider four such accounts.  
 
Finally, recall that, in this study, the term ‘physical facts’ is used broadly to include 
natural facts. The proposed account is supposed to cover mathematical explanations of 
natural facts. I believe that this account could also be extended to social facts. For, 
arguably, in current social science there is also a mathematical constitution of various 
social facts, economic facts being a prime example. But, for lack of space, I leave the 
consideration of this issue for another opportunity. 
 
 
9 On mathematical explanations of physical facts  
 
Recently, the literature on the mathematical explanation of physical facts has grown 
steadily and various accounts have been proposed. Here I can only consider some of 
them, and the choice reflects the way the current study has developed so far. Analyzing 
putative examples of mathematical explanations of physical facts, I will argue that the 
structure of the explanation in these accounts is unclear and that they are susceptible to 
the objection that the mathematical frameworks, structures or facts that they appeal to 
play a representational rather than explanatory role. I will then show how these accounts 
could be revised along the lines of the proposed account to circumvent these challenges.  
  
 
9.1 On a D-N mathematical explanation of the life cycle of ‘periodical’ cicadas 
 
Alan Baker (2005, 2009, 2017) proposes a D-N-like account of mathematical explanation 
of physical facts. In presenting the account, he focuses on a natural phenomenon that is 
drawn from evolutionary biology: the life-cycle of the so-called ‘periodical’ cicada. 
Certain species of the North-American cicada share the same kind of unusual life-cycle, 
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where the nymph remains in the soil for a lengthy period, and then the adult cicada 
emerges after either 13 or 17 years, depending on the geographical area. Strikingly, the 
emergence is synchronized among all the members of a cicada species in any given area. 
The adults emerge within the same few days, they mate, die a few weeks later and then 
the cycle repeats itself” (Baker 2005, p. 229). Baker’s explanation concentrates on the 
prime-numbered-year cicada life-cycle and it proceeds as follows (Baker 2005, pp. 230-
233, 2009, p. 614, 2017, p. 195).  
 
        Explanation of the periodical cicada life-cycle 
 
 
(1) Having a life-cycle period that minimizes intersection with other (nearby/lower) 
periods is evolutionarily advantageous. [biological law] 
 
(2) Prime periods minimize intersection (compared to non-prime periods). [number 
theoretic theorem] 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(3) Hence organisms with periodic life cycles are likely to evolve periods 
that are prime. [‘mixed’ biological/mathematical law] (from (1) and (2)) 
 
(4)    Cicadas in ecosystem-type E are limited by biological constraints to 
   periods from 14 to 18 years. [ecological constraint] 
            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
(5)   Hence cicadas in ecosystem-type E are likely to evolve 17-year periods.  
  (from (3) and (4))  
 
Before turning to discuss this explanation, a few remarks are in place. First, the 
explanation is actually incomplete. It is based on the implicit assumption that if 
something is evolutionary advantageous, it is likely to occur. This assumption is required 
for (1) and (2) to imply (3). Second, in appealing to the D-N explanation, Baker (2005, p. 
235) broadens “the category of laws of nature to include mathematical theorems and 
principles, which share commonly cited features such as universality and necessity.” 
Third, whether the above explanation is in fact a good explanation of the periodical 
cicada life-cycle will not matter for the analysis of the nature of Baker’s proposed D-N-
like account of mathematical explanation of physical facts.    
 
Baker’s core thesis is that “the cicada case study is an example of an indispensable, 
mathematical explanation of a purely natural phenomenon” (Baker 2009, p. 614). There 
have been various objections to this explanation, such as that the choice of mathematical 
apparatus here is arbitrary (e.g. because of the choice of time units), that the explanation 
begs the question against nominalism, and that the mathematical facts in the explanation 
play a representational rather than explanatory role (Melia 2000, 2002, Leng 2005, Bangu 
2008, Baker 2009, Daly and Langford 2009, Saatsi 2011, 2016, 2018, Koo 2015). Since 
my main interest here is to identify the nature of Baker’s proposed explanation, I will 
focus on the last objection.  
 
Daly and Langford (2009, p. 657) argue that  
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[i]t is this property of the cicadas’ life-cycle duration – this periodic intersection 
with the life-cycles of certain predatory kinds of organism – that plays an 
explanatory role in why their life-cycle has the duration it has. Primes have similar 
properties, and so successfully index the duration. But then so also do various non-
primes: measuring the life-cycle in seasons produces analogous patterns. 
 
That is, it is the concrete facts – the durations of the life-cycles of the cicada and of the 
other relevant organisms in its environment, and the forces of evolution – that provide the 
explanation, and the number of units these durations amount to (relative to a given 
measuring system) only index the duration measured.  
 
Saatsi (2011, 2016) expresses a similar objection, proposing that Baker’s argument could 
proceed with an alternative premise to (2) and (3): 
 
(2/3) For periods in the range of 14–18 years the intersection-minimizing period is 
        17. [Fact about time] 
 
While Daly, Langford and Saatsi have nominalist sympathies, the objection that the 
mathematical fact in Baker’s explanation plays only a representational role has also been 
submitted by Brown (2012, p. 11) who advocates Platonism.  
 
Baker (2017, p. 198) replies that the above nominalist perspective lacks a scope 
generality: it is inapplicable to other situations in which the ecological conditions are 
different. As he points out, this is not only a hypothetical point, as there are subspecies of 
the periodical cicada with 13-year life cycles. Indeed, (2/3) could be generalized into a 
schema (Saati 2011, p. 152): 
 
(2/3)* There is a unique intersection minimizing period Tx for periods in the 
          range [T1, . . . , T2] years.  
 
Yet, Baker (ibid., p. 199) notes that while (2/3)* has a more general scope, the 
explanation that this schema provides is less unified and has less depth than the original 
one. Further, Baker argues that the nominalist perspective also lacks topic generality 
(ibid., pp. 200-208). A mathematical explanation of physical facts has a higher topic 
generality if the mathematical facts that are supposed to do the explanation could apply to 
explanations of other topics. For example, Baker shows that a revised version of the 
explanation in (1)-(5), which meets scope generality and topic generality, could share the 
same core as an explanation of why in brakeless fixed-gear bicycles the most popular 
gear ratios are 46/17, 48/17, 50/17, and 46/15.   
 
Baker argues that: (a) for explanations to have a high level of scope and topic generality, 
mathematics is indispensable; (b) the interpretation of the mathematical facts in a 
mathematical explanation of physical facts as representations of physical facts will limit 
the topic generality of the explanation; and (c) the optimal version of the mathematical 
explanation of the cicada life-cycle “has an explanatory core that is topic general, and is 
not ‘about’ any designated class of physical facts, such as facts about time, or facts about 
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durations” (ibid., p. 201). To establish (c), he proposes a generalized explanation of the 
cicada life-cycle, which I discuss below. 
 
I agree with Baker’s observation that the nominalist perspective restricts the level of 
scope generality and topic generality of explanations. But I don’t think that his response 
meets the objection that, in his account, mathematics only represents the physical facts 
that actually do the explanation. In what follows, I will present the challenge for Baker’s 
account, first considering the original explanation of the periodical cicada life-cycle and 
then the generalized version.  
 
Baker’s explanation in (1)-(5) is ambiguous because premise (2) is ambiguous. It could 
be interpreted as: 
 
(2i) a fact about time, i.e. a physical fact; or 
 
(2ii) a theorem about number theory, i.e. a purely mathematical fact.  
 
For the above D-N-like explanation to be valid, it requires (2i) rather than (2ii); since 
(2ii) is a pure mathematical fact, (1) and (2ii) per se do not imply (3). Thus, it may be 
argued that it is the physical fact about time in (2i) that explains why the cicadas’ life-
cycle is likely to be prime, and the mathematical fact in (2ii) only represents the physical 
fact in (2i); and the impression that (1) and (2ii) entail (3) is due to an equivocation 
between (2i) and (2ii). The upshot is that Baker fails to demonstrate that the explanation 
of the periodical cicada life-cycle above is a mathematical explanation of a physical fact. 
If we interpret premise (2) as a physical fact about the nature of time, i.e. as (2i), the D-
N-like explanation in (1)-(5) is a physical explanation of a physical fact, and it is not clear 
what explanatory role the mathematical fact about prime numbers plays. If, on the other 
hand, we interpret (2) as a purely mathematical fact, i.e. as (2ii), the explanation becomes 
either invalid or unclear: if the explanation is supposed to be a D-N-like explanation, 
where the explanandum follows deductively from the explanans, it is invalid; and if the 
explanation is not intended as a D-N-like explanation, it is not clear what kind of 
explanation it is.    
 
It may be tempting to reply that the above objection does not apply to Baker’s 
generalized explanation of the cicada life-cycle, where the explanatory core is not ‘about’ 
any designated class of physical facts because of its topic generality. Yet, as we shall see 
below, the generalized explanation is still subject to the same challenge.  
 
 Generalized explanation of the periodical cicada life-cycle 
 
(M1) The lowest common multiple (LCM) of two numbers, m, n, is maximal if and 
          only if m and n are coprime. [pure mathematical fact] 
 
(UC1) The gap between successive co-occurrences of the same pair of cycle  
            elements of two unit-cycles is equal to the LCM of their respective lengths. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(UC2) Hence any pair of unit-cycles with periods m and n maximizes the gap  
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           between successive co-occurrences of the same pair of cycle elements if and  
           only if m and n are coprime. (from M1 and UC1)  
 
(M2) All and only prime numbers are coprime with all smaller numbers. [pure 
         mathematical fact] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(UC3) Hence, given a unit-cycle, pm, of length m and a range of unit cycles, 
            qi, of lengths shorter than m, pm maximizes the gap between successive 
         intersections with each qi if and only if m is prime. (from UC2, M2)  
 
(1G) For periodical organisms, having a life-cycle period that maximizes the gap 
         between successive co-occurrences with periodical predators is evolutionarily 
         advantageous. [biological law] 
 
(2G) Periodical organisms with periodical predators whose life cycles are restricted 
      to multiples of a common base unit can be modeled as pairs of unit-cycles. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(3G) Hence organisms with periodic life-cycles that are exposed to periodic  
         predators with shorter life-cycles, and whose life cycles are restricted to  
         multiples of a common base unit, are likely to evolve periods that are prime.  
         [‘mixed’ biological/mathematical law] (from UC3, 1G, 2G) 
 
(4G) North American periodical cicadas fit the application conditions stated in 
         premise (3G). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(5G) Hence periodical cicadas are likely to evolve periods that are prime.  
        (from 3G, 4G) 
 
(6G) Cicadas in ecosystem-type E are limited by biological constraints to periods 
      from 14 to 18 years. [ecological constraint] 
 
 (7G) 17 is the only prime number between 14 and 18. [pure mathematical fact] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(8G) Hence cicadas in ecosystem-type E are likely to evolve 17-year periods. (from 
            5G, 6G, 7G) 
 
As it is not difficult to see, in the above explanation the explanatory core – (M1), (M2), 
and (UC1) - (UC3) – is topic general. Yet, similarly to the original explanation, one could 
argue that for the inference from (UC3), (1G) and (2G) to (3G) to be valid, (UC3) has to 
be interpreted as a proposition about physical systems – all the physical systems that 
satisfy the requirement of topic generality under consideration – and that the 
mathematical fact in (UC3) is only a representation of this universal physical fact. Since 
(UC3) follows from (UC1) and (UC2) (and (M1) and (M2)), for the explanation to be 
valid, (UC1) and (UC2) also have to be interpreted as propositions about physical 
systems – again, all the physical systems that satisfy the requirement of topic generality 
under consideration. Thus, like in the original explanation, the generalized explanation of 
the periodical cicada life-cycle is subject to the challenge that it is either a physical 
explanation of a physical fact, invalid, or unclear.  
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The objection above can be divided into two related objections. (a) For the conclusion 
(8G) to follow from the premises in the generalized explanation of the cicada life-cycle, 
(UC1) - (UC3) have to be interpreted as propositions about physical facts. Thus, the 
explanation is a physical explanation of a physical fact, and it is not clear in what sense it 
is a mathematical explanation of a physical fact. (b) Like in the original explanation of 
the cicada life-cycle, it may be argued that mathematics plays a representational rather 
than explanatory role: it represents the physical facts that actually explains the cicada life-
cycle.  
 
The second objection is particularly compelling against those who assume that the 
physical can be separated from the mathematical. It presupposes that the facts about 
physical co-occurrences could be separated from the corresponding mathematical facts. 
Similarly, in the original explanation of the cicada life-cycle, the objection presupposes 
that the physical fact that prime time periods minimize intersection with other 
(nearby/lower) periods can be separated from the corresponding mathematical fact. But 
these presuppositions are unwarranted for those who take the mathematical to constitute 
the physical. Granted the mathematical constitution of the physical, the physical fact that 
prime time periods minimize intersection with other (nearby/lower) periods is constituted 
by number theory, in general, and its theorems about prime numbers, in particular. 
Accordingly, the physical fact that prime time periods minimize intersection with other 
(nearby/lower) periods cannot be separated from the corresponding mathematical fact. 
Likewise, facts about physical co-occurrences are constituted by number theory, in 
general, and its theorems about prime numbers, in particular. Thus, such facts cannot be 
separated from the corresponding mathematical facts. 
 
Granted the mathematical constitution of the physical, Baker’s D-N-like account of 
mathematical explanation of physical facts can be revised as follows to circumvent the 
objections in (a) and (b). A mathematical explanation of physical facts is a physical 
explanation of physical facts along the D-N model in which the mathematical constitution 
of some physical facts in the explanans is highlighted. The idea here is that by 
highlighting the mathematical constitution of certain physical facts in the explanans, the 
explanation deepens and expands the scope of the understanding of the physical fact in 
the explanandum. Focusing on the original explanation of the periodical cicada life-cycle, 
the revised account has two parts. First, it derives deductively the likelihood of the prime-
numbered-year life-cycle of the periodical cicada from general biological facts, particular 
facts about the periodical cicada and its eco-system, and facts about physical time. 
Second, it highlights the mathematical constitution of physical time, in general, and the 
mathematical constitution of the fact that prime periods of physical time minimize 
intersection with other time periods, in particular. Indeed, the theorem of number theory 
in (2ii) is a reflection of this constitution. Time is modelled as a line of real numbers and 
accordingly time intervals with a length equal to a natural number are subject to the 
theorems of number theory. In highlighting the mathematical constitution of these 
physical facts, the explanation deepens our understanding of the curious life-cycle of the 
periodical cicada in eco-system type E and expands the potential scope of the explanation 
to the life-cycle of other subspecies of the periodical cicada. Turning to the generalized 
explanation of the periodical cicada life-cycle, in addition to showing how the likelihood 
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of the prime-numbered-year life-cycle of the periodical cicada follows deductively from 
general biological facts, particular facts about the periodical cicada and its eco-system, 
and universal physical facts about successive co-occurrences of the same pair of cycle 
elements of two-unit cycles, the explanation highlights the mathematical constitution of 
these latter physical facts. In highlighting these facts, the explanation deepens the 
understanding of the periodical cicada life-cycle in ecosystem-type E and expands its 
potential scope to explanations of other subspecies of the periodical cicada – namely, 
periodical cicada in other types of ecosystems – as well as to explanations of various 
other natural facts. 
 
As it is not difficult to see, the proposed revision of Baker’s account of mathematical 
explanation of physical facts is not subject to the objections in (a) and (b). Premise (2) in 
the original explanation of the periodical cicada life-cycle and premises (UC1) - (UC3) in 
the generalized explanation of this life-cycle are interpreted as statements about intervals 
of time and physical unit-cycles, respectively. Thus, the objection that the explanans in 
these explanations do not imply their explanandum does not apply. Further, the logical 
structure of the explanation is clear, and, by construction, mathematics plays an 
explanatory role.  
 
 
9.2 On structural explanation of the uncertainty relations 
 
Dorato and Felline (2011, p. 161) comment that the ongoing controversy concerning the 
interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics may explain why philosophers 
have often contrasted the poor explanatory power of quantum theory to its unparalleled 
predictive capacity. Yet, they claim, “quantum theory provides a kind of mathematical 
explanation of the physical phenomena it is about”, which they refer to as structural 
explanation. To demonstrate their claim, they present two case studies: one involves the 
quantum uncertainty relations between position and momentum, and the other focuses on 
quantum nonlocality.  
 
Following Clifton (1998, p. 7)7, Dorato and Felline (2011, p. 163) hold that  
 
we explain some feature B of the physical world by displaying a mathematical 
model of part of the world and demonstrating that there is a feature A of the model 
that corresponds to B, and is not explicit in the definition of the model.  
 
The idea here is that the explanandum B is made intelligible via its structure similarities 
with its formal representative, the explanans A. How do these structural similarities 
render the explanandum intelligible? Dorato and Felline propose that “in order for such a 
representational relation to also be sufficient for a structural explanation, … we have to 
accept the idea that we understand the physical phenomenon in terms of its formal 
representative, by locating the latter in the appropriate model” (ibid., p. 165).  
                                               




Consider, for example, the uncertainty relations between position and momentum. In 
standard quantum mechanics, systems’ position and momentum are related through 
Fourier transforms, and Dorato and Felline locate the explanans as the mathematical 
properties of the Fourier transforms that represent the relations between position and 
momentum. The formal representation of the momentum (position) of a particle is a 
Fourier transform of the formal representation of its position (momentum), and Dorato 
and Felline propose that these Fourier transforms are required to make intelligible the 
relevant, represented physical phenomena of the uncertainty relations between position 
and momentum. These transformations are supposed to constitute the answer to the 
question “why do position and momentum not assume simultaneously sharp 
magnitudes?”: “because their formal representatives in the mathematical model have a 
property that makes this impossible” (ibid., p 166).   
 
Since ‘because’ here is not supposed to have a causal interpretation, the question arises as 
to its exact meaning. Dorato and Felline do not address this question explicitly. Their 
structural account of explanation seems to be based on the following key ideas: (i) A 
structural explanation makes the explanandum understandable; (ii) we understand a 
physical fact by making it intelligible; (iii) the assumption that the properties of a 
physical system exemplify the relevant parts of the mathematical model that represents it 
allows one to use the properties of the latter to make intelligible the properties of the 
former; (iv) there is a structure-preserving morphism from the representing mathematical 
model to the represented physical fact, and this relation ensures that the represented fact 
can be made intelligible by locating its representative in the mathematical model. Yet, 
these ideas leave the logical structure of the structural explanation unclear. In particular, 
the extent to which the structural explanation is different from mere representation is 
unclear. Indeed, as Dorato and Felline acknowledge, one may raise the objection that the 
proposed explanation is a mere translation or redescription of the physical explanation to 
be given (ibid., p. 166). They concede that, in a sense, it is the physical properties that do 
the explanation. They consider, for example, a balance with eight identical apples, five on 
one pan and three on the other.  
 
If someone explained the dropping of the pan with five apples (or the rising of the 
side with three) by simply saying “5 > 3”, he/she would not have provided a 
genuine explanation. The side with five apples drops because it is heavier and 
because of the role that its gravitational mass has vis-à-vis the earth, not because  
5 > 3! 
 
In reply, Dorato and Felline claim that “structural explanations are not so easily 
translatable into non-mathematical terms without loss of explicative power” (ibid., p. 
167). The problem with this reply is that it does not really address the above objection. 
The question under consideration is not whether to replace mathematical explanations 
with non-mathematical ones. Rather, it is a question about the nature of the mathematical 
explanation on offer. In particular, it is not clear in what sense the proposed structural 
explanation is a mathematical explanation of physical facts rather than a physical 
explanation of physical facts in which mathematics only plays a representational role. For 
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example, focusing on the explanation of the uncertainty relations, it is not clear why 
rendering the uncertainty relations between position and momentum intelligible by 
pointing to the Fourier transforms between the functions that represent position and 
momentum is a mathematical explanation of a physical fact rather than a physical 
explanation of a physical fact in which mathematics only plays a representational role.  
 
Another aspect that is unclear in Dorato and Felline’s structural explanation is related to 
the question whether the proposed pattern of explanation requires an interpretation of the 
representing mathematical model. Dorato and Felline conceive the structural explanation 
as providing “a common ground for understanding [the uncertainty relations between 
position and momentum], independently of the various different ontologies underlying 
the different interpretations of quantum theory” (ibid., p. 165). The question arises then: 
How does this conception square with the fact that their structural explanation relies on 
the idea that for a mathematical model to explain properties of a physical system the 
physical system has to exemplify the relevant parts of the model? The problem here is 
that the quantum-mechanical formalism represents different things under different 
interpretations. Consider, for example, Bohmian mechanics (Goldstein 2017). The 
functions that represent systems’ positions and momentum in the standard interpretation 
of the quantum-mechanical formalism do not represent their position and momentum in 
Bohmian mechanics. Under this alternative interpretation, quantum systems always have 
definite position and momentum, and systems’ position and momentum do not exemplify 
the Fourier transform relations. Thus, the explanation that the quantum-mechanical 
formal representatives – the Fourier transforms between position and momentum – have a 
property that makes it impossible for systems to have simultaneously definite position 
and momentum is not correct in this case. The functions that represent systems’ position 
and momentum in the standard interpretation represent in Bohmian mechanics the range 
of possible outcomes of measurements of positions and momentum and their 
probabilities; and the Fourier transform relations between these functions reflect the 
epistemic limitation on the knowledge of systems’ position and momentum. The upshot is 
that Dorato & Felline ’s structural explanation cannot circumvent the question of the 
interpretation of the quantum-mechanical formalism.   
 
Granted the mathematical constitution of the physical, Dorato & Felline’s structural 
account of explanation can be revised along the lines proposed in Section 8 so as to meet 
the above challenges. The main idea of the revised account is that a reference to the 
mathematical representatives of physical facts is explanatory if it highlights the 
mathematical constitution of these facts and thus deepen and potentially extend the scope 
of our understanding of them. For example, the statement that, in standard quantum 
mechanics, position and momentum cannot assume simultaneously definite values 
“because their formal representatives in the mathematical model have a property that 
makes this impossible” is explanatory because it highlights the mathematical constitution 
of the relations between position and momentum and thus deepen our understanding of 
these relations. In Bohmian mechanics, a reference to these formal representatives also 
highlights the mathematical constitution of physical facts, but the physical facts are not 
the same as in standard quantum mechanics. In Bohmian mechanics, the highlighting is 
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of the mathematical constitution of the limitation on simultaneous measurements, and 
accordingly knowledge, of a system’s position and its momentum at any given time. >>> 
 
 
9.3 On abstract mathematical explanation of the impossibility of a minimal tour 
across the bridges of Königsberg 
 
Pincock (2007, 2011a,b, 2012, 2015) proposes an account of mathematical explanation 
which he calls abstract explanation. Like most causal accounts of explanation, abstract 
explanation is based on the idea of an objective dependence relation between the 
explanandum and the explanans, but the notion of dependence in play is different from 
the causal notion of dependence (Pincock 2015, p. 877). In the case of abstract 
explanation, the dependence is on an abstract entity which is a more abstract than the 
state of affairs being explained (ibid., p. 879). Pincock has applied this account to various 
examples, one of which is the explanation of the impossibility of a ‘minimal’ tour across 
the bridges of Königsberg.  
 
The citizens of 18th C Königsberg wished to make a minimal tour across the city’s 
bridges (see Fig. 1), crossing each bridge exactly once and returning to the starting point.  
But they failed. Euler saw that the network of bridges and islands yield a certain abstract 
structure. Represented in graph theory, this structure has edges which correspond to 
bridges and vertices which correspond to islands or banks (see Fig. 2). Let us call a graph 
‘Eulerian’ just in case it has a continuous path from a vertex that crosses each edge 
exactly once and return to that vertex (for an example of such a graph, see Fig. 3). Then, 
Euler’s (1736/1956) conclusions about minimal tours across bridge systems can be 
reformulated as the following theorem in graph theory.8  
 
Euler’s theorem: A graph is Eulerian if and only if it contains no odd vertices; 





Fig. 1: The bridges of Königsberg 
                                               8	Since graph theory did not exist at the time, this is obviously an anachronistic account of Euler’s 
reasoning. That is not a problem for the current discussion, as the aim is not to reconstruct Euler’s 
own analysis but rather to consider Pincock’s account of mathematical explanation of physical 
facts. For Euler’s reasoning, see Euler (1736/1956), and for a reconstruction of it, see, for 
example, Hopkins and Wilson (2004).	
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  Fig. 2: The graph of the bridges of Königsberg: Edges correspond to bridges and vertices 
  correspond to islands or banks  
 
        
 
           Fig. 3: An example of Eulerian graph  
 
Pincock’s proposed abstract explanation for the impossibility of a minimal tour across the 
bridges of Königsberg is that such a tour is impossible because the corresponding graph 
is not Eulerian. Put another way, the impossibility of a minimal tour across the bridges of 
Königsberg is abstractly dependent on the corresponding graph not being Eulerian.  
 
Pincock’s motivation for an abstract explanation of the impossibility of a minimal walk 
across the Königsberg bridge system is that it seems superior because it gets to the root 
cause of why such a walk is impossible by focusing on the abstract structure of this 
system. More generally, abstracting away from various physical facts, such as the bridge 
materials and dimensions, size of the islands and river banks, etc., scientists can often 
give better explanations of features of physical systems (Pincock 2007, p. 260).  
 
Since abstract dependence is supposed to be objective but not causal, the question arises 
as to what kind of dependence it is. Pincock considers a few candidates. First, he (2015) 
discusses Woodward’s (2003, p. 221) proposal that  
 
the common element in many forms of explanation, both causal and noncausal, is 
that they must answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions. … When a 
theory or derivation answers a what-if-things-had-been-different question but we 
cannot interpret this as an answer to a question about what would happen under an 
intervention, we may have a noncausal explanation of some sort. 
 
In the case of Pincock’s abstract account of explanation, the question that is answered 
concerns the “the systematic relationship between the more abstract objects and their 
properties [the explanans], and the more concrete objects and their properties [the 
explanandum].” Pincock comments that Woodward’s proposal could be applicable to 
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abstract explanations “if the sort of explanatory question here could be suitably clarified” 
(ibid., p. 869).  
 
Next, Pincock (ibid., p. 869-871) discusses Strevens’ (2008) Kairetic account of 
explanation. He notes that the Kairetic account “allows important explanatory 
contributions from more abstract entities like mathematical objects.” He considers 
whether this account – which, like Woodward’s account, is based on the idea of 
difference making, and moreover aims to reduce all explanations to causal explanations – 
could be a candidate for explicating the notion of abstract dependence. Pincock rejects 
this route on the ground that abstract dependence violates Strevens’ ‘cohesion’ condition; 
where a causal model is cohesive “if its realizers constitute a contiguous set in causal 
similarity space” (Strevens 2008, p. 101). 
 
Pincock (2011) also considers a notion of difference making which is explicated in terms 
of comparisons across relevant range of possibilities. Applying this notion to the 
explanation of why a minimal tour across the bridges of Königsberg is impossible, his 
reasoning is basically as follows. Let’s V be a binary variable that denote whether all 
vertices of a graph are even, E be a binary variable that denote whether the graph is 
Eulerian, and M be a binary variable that denote whether there is a minimal tour across 
the bridges of Königsberg. The graph of the bridges of Königsberg fails to be Eulerian, 
but many similar graphs have all even valence vertices and each of these graphs is 
Eulerian. Thus, V makes a difference for E. Further, the bridges of Königsberg fail to 
have a corresponding graph that is Eulerian and they fail to have a minimal tour, but 
many similar bridge systems have a corresponding graph that is Eulerian and each of 
these other bridge systems has a minimal tour. Thus, E makes a difference for M.  
 
In the above proposal, the exact nature of abstract dependence is still unclear. In 
particular, Pincock does not explicate the type of similarity he has in mind, so it is 
difficult to evaluate the nature of modality involved in his proposed notion of difference 
making. Relatedly, it may be argued that Pincock’s reasoning does not establish that E 
(V) makes a difference for M but rather that there is a correspondence between E (V) and 
M, and that such a correspondence per se does not qualify as a difference making. It is 
also unclear why one needs to appeal to the notion of difference making in order to 
establish the modal relation between V and E given that one could simply provide a 
mathematical proof of Euler’s theorem.  
 
Finally, Pincock (2015) considers Koslicki’s (2012) notion of ontological dependence as 
a possible route to explicating the nature of abstract dependence. One variety of such a 
dependence is the following. 
 
Constituent Dependence: An entity, F, is constituent dependent on an entity (or 
entities), Y, just in case Y is an essential constituent (or are essential constituents) 
of F. (Koslicki, ibid., p. 205) 
 
An example of such ontological dependence is lightning: “for lightning to occur is just 
for energy to be discharged by some electrons in a certain way, and when lightning 
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occurs, these electrons are constituents of the lightning” (Pincock 2015, p. 878). Pincock 
(ibid., p. 879) remarks that while “it might be tempting to try to reduce abstract 
dependence to constituent dependence” and “[it] is hard to argue that this cannot be 
done.” But 
 
there is one prima facie barrier that seems difficult to overcome. … [a] 
distinguishing feature of abstract explanation and abstract dependence is that we 
appeal to a more abstract entity that has a more concrete entity as an instance. … 
By contrast, in the constituent cases, the entities that we appeal to in the explanation 
are constituents of the fact to be explained. 
 
As the brief review of Pincock’s attempts to explicate abstract dependence demonstrates, 
the nature of this dependence remains unclear. Further, the abstract account of 
explanation is open to the objection that mathematics just plays a representational role. 
The idea here is that the graph that corresponds to the bridges of Königsberg only 
represents the relevant physical structure of this bridge system which explains the 
impossibility of a minimal tour (Janssen and Saatsi, forthcoming).9 This objection has 
more traction in view of the difficulties in explicating abstract dependence, and it is even 
more pressing for those who deny the mathematical constitution of the physical; for it is 
difficult to see how the impossibility of a minimal tour – a physical fact – could depend 
on a mathematical object – a graph – if the physical is fundamentally non-mathematical.  
 
While the prospects of explicating abstract dependence in terms of Constituent 
Dependence seem dim, there are other notions of ontological dependence that escape this 
fate. In particular, the notions of mathematical constitution of physical facts we reviewed 
in Section 4 are not subject to Pincock’s concern about Constituent Dependence. When 
abstract dependence involves a dependence of physical facts on mathematical structures 
or facts, it could be explicated in terms of these notions of mathematical constitution. 
Consider, again, the bridges of Königsberg. The impossibility of a minimal tour across 
the Königsberg bridge system is due to its physical structure. This physical structure has a 
mathematical constitution. Some aspects of this constitution, which concern the topology 
of the Königsberg bridge system, are highlighted by graph theory, in general, and Euler’s 
theorem, in particular. Thus, abstract explanation of the impossibility of a minimal tour 
across the Königsberg bridge system could be conceived as highlighting the aspects of 
the mathematical constitution of the physical structure of this bridge system that render 
such a tour impossible. Envisaged in this way, the explanation highlights the ontological 
dependence of the physical structure of the Königsberg bridge system on a certain 
mathematical structure, which is expressed in terms of graph theory. Highlighting the 
relevant aspects of the mathematical constitution of this physical structure deepens our 
understanding of the impossibility of a minimal tour across it. It also increases the scope 
                                               9	Vineberg (2018) suggests that the objection above does not apply to the structuralist 
understanding of mathematics. It is not clear, however, how an appeal to this conception of 
mathematics could help here. One may accept the structuralist rejection of mathematical objects 
yet argue that mathematical structures only represent the physical structures which actually do the 
explanation.    
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of our understanding by relating this impossibility to various other cases of possible and 
impossible minimal tours.    
 
 
9.4 On explanations by constraints that are more necessary than laws of nature 
 
In Because without cause: Non-causal explanations in science and mathematics, Lange 
(2016) considers examples of “distinctively mathematical explanations” that are of the 
kind we discussed above. For him, distinctively mathematical explanations are subspecies 
of a more general type of non-causal explanation: “explanations by constraint”.  
 
Explanations by constraint work not by describing the world’s causal relations, but 
rather by describing how the explanandum arises from certain facts (“constraints”) 
possessing some variety of necessity stronger than ordinary laws of nature possess. 
The mathematical facts figuring in distinctively mathematical explanations possess 
one such stronger variety of necessity: mathematical necessity. (Ibid., p. 10)  
 
Lange suggests that a distinctive mathematical explanation appeals “only to facts 
(including but not always limited to mathematical facts) that are modally stronger than 
ordinary laws of nature, together with contingent conditions that are contextually 
understood to be constitutive of the arrangement or task at issue in the why question” 
(ibid., pp. 9-10). That is, in such explanations the explanans consist of mathematically 
necessary facts and possibly other facts that possess some variety of necessity stronger 
than laws of nature possess, as well as contingent conditions which are presupposed by 
the why question under consideration. The explanation shows that “the fact to be 
explained could not have been otherwise – indeed, was inevitable to a stronger degree 
than could result from actions of causal powers” (ibid., pp. 6-7). Under the presupposed 
contingent conditions, the explanadum arises from the mathematical facts and possibly 
other necessary facts (the “constraints”), and it is necessary in a stronger sense than the 
necessity that ordinary laws of nature mandate. Thus, the explanation works  
 
not by describing the world’s actual causal structure, but rather by showing how the 
explanandum arises from the framework that any possible physical system (whether 
or not it figures in causal relations) must inhabit, where the “possible” systems 
extend well beyond those that are logically consistent with all of the actual natural 
laws. (Ibid., pp. 30-31) 
 
For example, the fact that a mother failed repeatedly to distribute evenly 23 strawberries 
among her 3 children without cutting any strawberry is explained by the mathematical 
fact that 23 cannot be divided evenly by 3 (ibid., p. 6). The explanation shows that 
mother’s success is impossible in a stronger sense than causal considerations underwrite 
(ibid., p. 30). The explanans in this case consist of the mathematical fact that 23 cannot 
be divided evenly by 3 and the contingent facts presupposed by the relevant why-
question: namely, that there are 23 strawberries and 3 children, and the distribution is of 
uncut strawberries. And the explanation shows that, under such contingent conditions, 
even distribution among the 3 children is impossible, where the impossibility is stronger 
than natural impossibility.   
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Saatsi (2018) poses two challenges for Lange’s account of explanation. One challenge is 
that “information about the strong degree of necessity involved [in explanation by 
constraint] risks being too cheap: the exalted modal aspect of the explanandum can be 
communicated without doing much explaining, and it can be grasped without having 
much understanding” (ibid., p. 5). Another challenge is to pin down the difference due to 
which non-causal explanations-by-constraint work so differently from causal 
explanations. Saatsi proposes, as an alternative to Lange’s approach, that causal and non-
causal explanations alike “can explain by virtue of providing what-if-things-had-been-
different information that captures a dependence relation between the explanandum and 
the explanans.” He believes that this counterfactual-dependence perspective suggests that, 
in various distinctively mathematical explanations, at the very least “we should not hang 
the analysis of explanatoriness entirely on the hook of modal ‘constraint’.” For example, 
“if we squeeze out, as it were, all the modal information regarding how Mother’s 
predicament would differ as a function of the number of strawberries/kids, it looks that 
we are left with a very shallow explanation at best, even if we fully retain the information 
concerning the exalted modal status of the explanandum” (ibid., p. 6). 	 
 
Lange (2016, 2018, p. 32) resists Saatsi’s proposal for understanding distinctively 
mathematical explanations in terms of counterfactual dependence. He maintains that 
some explanations by constraint, and more particularly some distinctively mathematical 
explanations, are associated with no pattern of counterfactual dependence. Further, he 
(2018, p. 33) also argues that “[s]ometimes the explanans and explanandum of 
explanations by constraint do figure in patterns of counterfactual dependence, but these 
patterns fail to track explanatory relations”. Yet, while Saatsi’s view that causal and non-
causal explanations could be accounted in terms of counterfactual dependence is 
controversial, his objections highlight the fact that the exact nature of Lange’s 
distinctively mathematical explanations is unclear. Consider, for example, Saatsi’s 
question: 
 
Why is it that given that mass is additive, if A has the mass of 1 kg, and B has the 
mass of 1 kg, then the union A+B has the mass of 2 kg?   
 
Lange (2018, p. 35) admits that “perhaps Saatsi is correct that the answer ‘Because 
1+1=2’ is ‘utterly shallow’.’’ But he suggests that  
 
that impression may arise from everyone’s knowing that 1+1=2 and that this fact 
suffices to necessitate the explanandum, so it is difficult to see what information 
someone asking Saatsi’s question might want. Furthermore, ‘‘Because 1+1=2’’ 
may not explain A+B’s mass at all, if A and B can chemically interact when 
‘‘united’’. (Ibid.) 
 
Indeed, the mathematical fact 1+1=2 and its intuitive relation to the explanandum are 
very familiar. But this familiarity conceals the fact that the exact structure of Lange’s 
account of distinctively mathematical explanation is unclear. That is, it is not clear from 
Lange’s account how the “because” of explanation is supposed to work: why a 
mathematical fact per se could explain facts about the nature of physical objects? One 
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may argue here that the fact that 1+1=2 seems to necessitate the explanandum is due to 
equivocation between: (i) the mathematical fact that 1+1=2; and (ii) the universal 
physical fact that, for any two possible physical objects of 1 kg, A and B, which are 
‘united’ without being changed (e.g. without having a chemical interaction), the total 
mass is 2 kg. That is, one may argue that it is the physical fact in (ii), rather the 
mathematical fact in (i), that actually does the explanation, and that the mathematical fact 
in (i) just represents the physical fact in (ii). Put another way, one may argue that the 
intuitive appeal of Lange’s distinctively mathematical explanation is due to the above 
equivocation, taking the explanation to be a physical explanation of a physical fact – it is 
an explanation of a particular physical fact in terms of a corresponding universal physical 
fact – in which the mathematical fact 1+1=2 only plays a representational role.  
 
The above objection is particularly compelling for those who maintain that the physical is 
ontologically separated from the mathematical. It can be circumvented by acknowledging 
the mathematical constitution of the physical. Distinctively mathematical explanations 
could then be understood as physical explanations of physical facts in which the 
mathematical constitution of some physical facts is highlighted by stating the constraints 
that this constitution mandates. In such explanations, there is no need to appeal to 
counterfactual dependence. For example, in explaining “why the union A+B has the mass 
of 2 kg?” by pointing out that “1+1=2”, one appeals to the universal physical fact that for 
any two possible physical objects of 1 kg, A and B, which are ‘united’ without being 
changed, the total mass of A+B is 2 kg. Yet, one observes that this universal physical fact 
is constituted by number theory, in general, and a mathematical fact that follows from it, 
1+1=2, in particular. There is no need to appeal to counterfactual dependence. Indeed, it 




10 Is the effectiveness of mathematics in physics unreasonable? 
 
It seems to be a dogma of contemporary mainstream philosophy of science that, 
fundamentally, physical facts are not mathematical, and that mathematics only provides a 
language for representing the physical realm, even if this language is indispensable. Thus, 
the idea of mathematical explanations of physical facts may naturally appear puzzling or 
even paradoxical. I argued above that the view that the physical is ontologically separated 
from the mathematical fails to make sense of the common view of how mathematical 
models and theories represent physical phenomena and reality in modern natural science. 
I suggested that this conundrum could be avoided if we accept the idea that the physical 
is constituted by the mathematical. I then reviewed two traditional ways of conceiving 
such a constitution: the Pythagorean and the neo-Kantian. Granted the mathematical 
constitution of the physical, I proposed a new account of mathematical explanation of 
physical facts. In this account, there are two related kinds of explanations. One kind of 
mathematical explanation of physical facts consists in: (E) explaining physical facts by 
physical facts along the lines of the D-N, causal, unification, or any other acceptable 
account of explanation; and (H) highlighting the mathematical constitution of some of the 
physical facts that do the explanation in (E) and thus deepening and expanding the scope 
of the understanding of the explained physical facts. The second kind of mathematical 
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explanation of physical facts consists in (H). I also considered four other accounts of 
mathematical explanation of physical facts. I argued that, unlike the proposed account, 
they are open to the challenge that the nature of their explanation is unclear and the 
objection that mathematics plays only a representational role, representing the physical 
facts that actually do the explanation. I then suggested that these accounts could be 
revised along the lines of the proposed account so as to circumvent both challenges. 
 
The proposed account is neutral with respect to the controversy in the philosophy of 
mathematics about the ontological status of ‘mathematical objects’ (numbers, sets, 
relations, functions, etc.). Further, it applies to both realist and instrumentalist 
interpretations of theories/models. The interpretation of the ontological status of 
theoretical terms only determines the scope of the mathematical constitution of the 
physical beyond the phenomena.  
 
In conclusion, I turn briefly to comment on how the idea of the mathematical constitution 
of the physical reflects on the question whether the effectiveness of the use of 
mathematics in physics is unreasonable. It is reasonable to assume that one’s conception 
of mathematics and its relation to physics is important for adjudicating this question. Let 
us consider then Wigner’s conception. Wigner (1960) holds that while  
 
the concepts of elementary mathematics and particularly elementary geometry were 
formulated to describe entities which are directly suggested by the actual world, the 
same does not seem to be true of the more advanced concepts, in particular the 
concepts which play such an important role in physics. … Most more advanced 
mathematical concepts, such as complex numbers, algebras, linear operators, Borel 
sets – and this list could be continued almost indefinitely – were so devised that 
they are apt subjects on which the mathematician can demonstrate his ingenuity and 
sense of formal beauty.  
 
He conceives mathematics as  
 
the science of skillful operations with concepts and rules invented just for this 
purpose. The principal emphasis is on the invention of concepts. … The depth of 
thought which goes into the formulation of the mathematical concepts is later 
justified by the skill with which these concepts are used. The great mathematician 
fully, almost ruthlessly, exploits the domain of permissible reasoning and skirts the 
impermissible. That his recklessness does not lead him into a morass of 
contradictions is a miracle in itself … The principal point which will have to be 
recalled later is that the mathematician could formulate only a handful of interesting 
theorems without defining concepts beyond those contained in the axioms and that 
the concepts outside those contained in the axioms are defined with a view of 
permitting ingenious logical operations which appeal to our aesthetic sense both as 
operations and also in their results of great generality and simplicity. 
 
Based on this conception and consideration of the application of various “advanced 
mathematical concepts” in physics, Wigner concludes that the appropriateness of the 
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language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a miracle, and he 
hopes that this miracle will continue in future research.  
 
On Wigner’s conception of mathematics, the relation between the physical and 
mathematical is not intrinsic. Advanced mathematics largely develops on its own and is 
then picked up by physicists to yield great success. It may thus be natural to see the 
success of the application of the language of mathematics in physics as surprising, 
mysterious, and even unreasonable. However, Wigner’s conception is controversial (see, 
for example, Lützen 2011, Ferreirós 2017, Islami 2017, and references therein). Some 
have argued that while Wigner’s view of mathematics seems to have been inspired by the 
formalist philosophy of mathematics, this philosophy has lost its credibility by the second 
half of the 20th century (Lützen 2011, Ferreirós 2017). Further, historically, the 
development of mathematics has been entangled with that of the natural sciences, in 
general, and physics, in particular, and Wigner’s conception of mathematics fails to 
reflect this fact. Consider, for example, complex numbers. Wigner singles them out as 
one of the prime examples of most advanced mathematical concepts that mathematicians 
invented for the sole purpose of demonstrating their ingenuity and sense of formal beauty 
without any regard to possible applications. Indeed, it seems that complex numbers were 
introduced by Scipione del Ferro, Niccola Fontana (also known as Tartaglia, the 
stammerer), Gerolamo Cardano, Ludovico Ferrari and Rafael Bombelli in the 16th 
century with no intent in mind to apply them. Yet, the context of the introduction was the 
attempt to solve the general forms of quadratic and cubic equations, which by that time 
had a long history of applications (Katz 2009). Thus, taking into account this broader 
context, the claim that the introduction of complex numbers was solely for the purpose of 
demonstrating ingenuity and sense of formal beauty is misleading.  
 
That is not to argue that all the developments in mathematics were connected to physics, 
neither to deny that in many cases future applications of mathematical concepts could not 
be anticipated at the time of their introduction. Yet, attention to the historical 
entanglement between the developments of mathematics and physics casts doubt on the 
validity and scope of Wigner’s argument for the unreasonable success of the application 
of mathematics in physics.  
 
In any case, while Wigner’s view of mathematics may provide some support to the view 
that the success of the application of mathematics in physics is unreasonable, things are 
very different if we conceive the mathematical as constitutive of the physical. In the 
context of such a conception, the relationship between mathematics and physics is 
intrinsic. The physical is characterized in mathematical terms. The physicist’s crude 
experience is formulated in precise mathematical terms, often in statistical models of the 
phenomena, and accordingly the gap between the phenomena and the theoretical models 
that account for them diminishes. There is no essential gap between the concepts of 
elementary mathematics and geometry and more advanced mathematical concepts. The 
division between applied and theoretical mathematics is neither a priori nor fundamental. 
And the appropriateness of the use of the language of mathematics for future physics is 
not in doubt. Thus, it is reasonable to expect the language of mathematics to be 
appropriate for representing physical reality. 
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Of course, such a conception of the role of mathematics in physics does not obliterate the 
sense of wonder that one has with respect to the fact that “in spite of the baffling 
complexity of the world, certain regularities in the events could be discovered” (Wigner, 
ibid.). Yet, the reasons to conceive this wonder in miraculous terms are not as compelling 
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